I am in agreement with Paolo [Salvadori]'s text (Provisional Theses, May 1970), apart from two slight differences. First, on page 5 of the French translation, [1] I think it is necessary to dialectize somewhat more the question of the relation of Bolshevism to the backwardness of productive forces in Russia, by pointing out the very role of Lenin's Bolshevism as a factor of retardation and regression for that central part of the productive forces: the revolutionary class's consciousness. Elsewhere (page 7) Paolo characterizes this formulation regarding what the SI [Situationist International] has so far been able to accomplish -- "the element of promise still surpasses the element of accomplishment" -- as a "slight exaggeration." On the contrary, I find this phrase to be completely true, without any exaggeration. With these theses of Paolo and a number of those expressed by various comrades, notably Raoul [Vaneigem], Rene [Riesel] and Tony [Verlaan] (as well as Gianfranco [Sanguinetti]'s very correct insistence on our developing certain economic analyses more concretely), it seems to me that we have a substantial basis from which we can more and more concretely develop both our strategical analysis and our theoretico-practical activity.
However, a few points remain to be dealt with that are preliminary to this debate (though they have already been touched on in texts by Rene [Riesel], Rene-Donatien [Vienet] and myself). Paolo was right to parenthesize these preliminaries, for they have little direct relation with his programmatic outline; and he has taken care, in a final note, to make the very significance of his text contingent on their practical resolution. We must thus now make an effort to determine these difficulties more concretely -- difficulties which are simultaneously archaisms in our own historical development and preconditions that we have to master before really undertaking the development of a more advanced perspective. [2]
In what follows, I will try to enunciate the principal traits of these difficulties, limiting myself to what I know well, that is to say, our existence in France and Italy. Thus, I won't speak of Jon [Horelick] or [JV] Martin, who are placed in very different (and much more difficult) conditions.[3] Nor of Tony [Verlaan], whose stay with the French [section of the SI] was too brief (and, aside from one or two initial misunderstandings that were quickly cleared up, very profitable in my opinion). It goes without saying that, in this text, I don't intend to place myself above critique in an organization that is ultimately the collective responsibility of its members. This aspect of self-critique will at least be implicit in these notes. Some other comrade [in the SI] will not fail to make precise those critiques that he thinks are fatally forgotten, either by me or the situationists in general, in preceding or subsequent discussions.[4]
After four months of this orientation debate we have not seen any theoretical divergences emerge; and this was fairly predictable. But one begins to wonder if these texts -- which go in the same general direction and many of which contain excellent points -- are not piling up like so many monologues while scarcely being used. To clarify what I mean regarding this underuse of theory: Just as Magritte could paint a pipe and then correctly write on the painting, "This is not a pipe," to declare that one does not separate theory and practice is not yet to practice theory. And putting revolutionary theory into practice is not at all messianically postponed until the victory of the revolution, it is required throughout the entire process of revolutionary activity. Similarly (and this too is only a theoretical observation, but a necessary one), we all naturally refuse to consider even the most fundamentally theoretical activity as separable from even the most distinctly practical activity. To formulate the most general revolutionary theory is inconceivable without a very precise practice, and vice versa. Even in a street fight you still have to think! But if we leave aside these dialectical truisms on extreme cases, we can consider the most common concrete situation in which dialecticians reveal themselves as such (even if many of them don't have the intellectual background enabling them to talk about dialectics or to write theory at the dialectical level). People meet each other. They talk about how they understand the world and what they think they can do in it. They judge each other while judging their world; and each judges the judgments of the others. They agree with or oppose each other's projects. If there is a common project, they have to know at different moments what this project has become. Their success or failure is measured by practice and their consciousness of practice (they may themselves, rightly or wrongly, characterize their failures and successes as secondary or decisive; the result may later be reversed and they may be aware of this or have forgotten it). Etc., etc. In a word, it is in this concerted and theorized action (which is also theory tested in action) that revolutionary dialecticians have to recognize as well as possible the decisive elements of a complex problem; the probable or modifiable (by them) interaction of these elements; the essential character of the moment as result, as well as the development of its negation. This is the territory of the qualitative where individuals, their acts, meaning and life know each other -- and where it is necessary to know how to know. The presence of history in the everyday life of revolutionaries. You comrades will certainly say that the preceding lines are very banal; and this is quite true. [5] Here now is a recent anecdote that is sufficiently original, in the sense of surprising and unexpected:
Everyone knows that Mustapha [Khayati], ever since the summer of 1969, has been involved in a Palestinian organization (cf. his meeting with Israeli Leftists as one of the representatives of this organization, [6] etc., which he mentioned at [the VIIIth Conference of the SI at] Venice [Italy]). Several weeks or months later, he informed the SI and thus -- only then -- resigned, since our opposition to "double membership" is absolute, and since he completely shares this point of view. We thus speak of his bad choice, rather than the bad manner of his choice, because the question was quite unilaterally resolved before it was posed; and our regrets accompanied it. At Venice, so as to make known the haughty reasons he had for making this choice, and for making it thus, Mustapha expounded an analysis of the possible revolutionary developments in Jordan and described the subjective necessity he felt to participate in this struggle. Immediately upon his arrival in Jordan (from which he had returned precisely at the moment of his declarations in Venice), he discovered -- according to his own recent account -- that there wasn't any such perspective! In an organization (the DPFLP) of which he is a formal member and of which he disapproves on at least several points, he didn't lead any political struggles, and let several months go by without bothering to jot down twenty lines of critique that might explain his resignation [from the SI]. He returned to Europe and at first met with the Italian comrades [in the SI]. They took from this meeting a principal, if not unique, conclusion: it would be excellent if Mustapha could once again become a member of the SI, since he is demystified of his Jordanian mirage and one can hope that he has such an intention. The problem became reduced to a negligible deviation, as if it was all a matter of certain -- now overcome -- divergences in the political appreciation of Middle Eastern perspectives.
I know that the Italian comrades had several solid and estimable reasons for desiring the return of Mustapha to the SI. But the arguments "in favor" can't be sustained if those who formulate them haven't considered the "centrist" arguments (which I cited in the preceding paragraph); because it is only after having seen and said these arguments that someone can undertake to show that they are less important than the reasons against [re-admission]. This is an example in which it is improbable that we have theoretical divergences on the question of organization; as to the meaning of the engagements that this question involves, I believe that the Italian comrades would not doubt the force of the arguments that I have cited (nor the degree of reality of the facts, since I've gotten them all from Mustapha himself). But why haven't they themselves cited them? Haven't the Italians understood their importance? Or, rather, have they -- as a result of careful discussions of the thirty annexed points ([Jordan's King] Hussein, Syria, [George] Habache [leader of the DPFLP], [Egypt's] Nasser, etc.) -- lost sight of them? Or have the Italians judged it unimportant to envision these aspects of the problem concerning Mustapha? This joy in the return of the Prodigal Son after his rout in the Middle East brings honor to the Italians' sense of the dialectic. One detail must be added. After having learned from Mustapha all the estimable work that he perhaps did while in Jordan, Rene-Donatien [Vienet] addressed to him a short letter, a little severe in tone (especially since there still persisted doubts concerning what had partially "justified" the wager of Mustapha's exotic action), but which indicated all the more clearly the "reduction" in the choice Mustapha made in 1969 -- at least in the eyes of Rene-Donatien. The Italian comrades received a copy of this letter. Its elements are decisive enough for each of us to discover and evaluate them for ourselves; and, in this sense, the Italians' copy of Rene-Donatien's letter has been useless. But it is there, and it is known. I don't find it all abnormal that this letter hasn't involved the immediate adhesion of all (it was a brief and very general statement, which quite brutally expressed an opinion, not an argument). But it is abnormal that this letter has been totally ignored. The comrades who disagree with Rene-Donatien must respond to him, must try to fight his severe position, etc. They are called upon to make the effort to contradict Rene-Donatien's conclusion, and to give reasons for their positions (if all of Rene-Donatien's reasons aren't in his letter, they are nevertheless known to all and this is truly the occasion to recall them!) If it certainly isn't a question of a deliberate snub, then it is necessary to understand that thoughtlessness must stop, because, in an organization, one cannot ignore someone else's statement of opinion; one can only approve of it or oppose it.
I have spent a little time on the preceding anecdote because it is recent, clear and, I hope, instructive. My intention wasn't to make fun of the Italian comrades, as if they are the only ones in the SI who have forgotten their dialectical arms while indulging in a passing enchantment, more suited to stories of the Round Table than to the knights of historic consciousness. [7] For example, while the Italians have been brilliant in showing that they know how to quickly produce an excellent journal of the SI, in Paris we have assisted for two or three months in the fantastic spectacle of three comrades (a fourth one was truly quite foreign to our world), [8] who have proven their talent on other occasions, but find themselves stupified before the "ordeal" of constructing and editing #13 of the French journal. [9] Nevertheless, what is extraordinary is their overwhelming laziness, not the fact that they found themselves responsible for this task. It is clear that the time for questioning this "laziness" (not more pronounced among them than everyone else) is passed. This isn't any longer a basically editorial question, because each of these comrades writes well enough and, from the start, made a rough sketch that wasn't criticizable. What has been badly conceived and communicated has been the essential points that will be made by their issue as a whole. And, beyond this, it is vain to hope to arrange things quantitatively, simply by writing, long and a little by chance, on all subjects susceptible of being treated in this issue (that is to say, in fact: all subjects). It isn't a question of simply having the situationist tone (which today is more or less accessible from diverse pro-situs), but thinking and choosing qualitatively what constitutes an issue. All the mysteries that push situationist theory to the mystical chatter of the pro-situs find their rational solution in the practice of formulating situationist theses and in the intelligence of their practice. These are the same difficulties of method that appear elsewhere and in the workings of the Editorial Committee, where it is more excusable, because the publication of an issue of the IS [Internationale Situationniste] truly presents several difficulties, which these comrade-editors have ignored. For the rest, they have only ignored it because they have never done it.[10]
Leaving aside the fact that all the issues of Internationale Situationniste have included a number of personal contributions (often notable and sometimes even discordant), it can be said that for the most part the anonymous portions of issues 1-5 were produced in a truly collective manner. Issues 6-9 were still done relatively collectively, mainly by Raoul, Attila [Kotanyi] and me. But from number 10 on, I have found myself left with almost the entire responsibility for preparing each publication. And what seems to me even more alarming and unhealthy is that I consider -- unbiasedly, I hope -- that these three issues are the best ones of the series! This situation was still somewhat obscured for me in numbers 10 and 11 by a small (but welcome) amount of collaboration from Mustapha (I'm still referring to the articles published without signature). We know that the departure of Mustapha right in the middle of the preparation of number 12 (though he'd already turned in the article on Czechoslovakia) pushed things to a scandalous point, since at the same time the membership of the French section had doubled. I resigned soon thereafter from the position as "director" of the journal, mainly so as not to be an accomplice to a sort of spectacular lie, since we all had plenty of opportunity to be aware of our distance in this regard from our stated principles. A year has now gone by since this problem was posed, and the present editor-comrades [Rene Riesel, Rene Vienet and Christian Sebastiani] are beginning to put themselves in a position to resolve it. If they succeed in this it will be by finally appropriating the methods that have "officially" been theirs for several years. [11]
This lack of awareness (on the affirmed base of historic consciousness) of the necessities of method in the different particular tasks obviously derives from a more general lack of awareness. In the case of two or three comrades, one can even assert a lack of information, in fact, a lack of sufficiently scatterbrained readers for the texts by the theoreticians of the proletariat and the realizers of philosophy and art. But even this is only an epi-phenomenon: it would be vain to be indignant about vulgar jokes. If certain people haven't read what the others quote from and use, they haven't wanted to and haven't needed to. I don't believe that it is taste that divides us. It is simply the case that these comrades haven't discovered anything to do that gives them the desire and the need. [12]
This deficiency of collective activity (I don't mean to say, of course, that we haven't collectively discussed, decided on and carried out a certain number of actions or writings, even during the last two years) is mainly noticeable -- in the French section -- by a sort of general aversion to any critique aimed at a specific fact or at one of us. This was quite evident at the July 14 [1970] meeting. The slightest critique is felt as a total calling into question, an absolute distrust, a manifestation of hostility, etc. And this emotional reaction is not only expressed by the criticized comrade. The SI comrades are very quick and adept at judging the pro-situs (the successive writings of the poor GRCA, for example), [13] that is to say, something of very little importance. But almost everyone manifests a strange reluctance when it comes to judging anything about a member of the SI. They are visibly uneasy even when someone else of us does so. I cannot believe that some hollow politeness is at the origin of this. It must therefore be a certain fatigue that sets in the moment questions are broached that really concern our movement: things we risk succeeding or failing in. In any case a critique is never carried further by other comrades and no one (except occasionally the criticized comrade) strives to draw from it any conclusions that might be useful for our subsequent collective action. In this way the SI has a tendency to freeze into a sort of perpetual and admirable present (as if a more or less admirable past was continued in it). This not very historical or practical harmony is only broken in two situations, in one case really, in the other only apparently. When a critique is really taken seriously and given practical consequences (because the incident is so glaring that everyone demands this conclusion) an individual is excluded. He is cut off from the harmonious communion, perhaps even without ever having been criticized before, or only once briefly. The apparent break in our habitual comfort happens this way: A critique is made or a defect of our action is pointed out. Everyone goes along with this critique, often without even bothering to express themselves about it; the point seems clear and undeniable, but boring (and correspondingly little attention is given to really remedying it). But if someone has insisted on the point, everyone admits that the detail is indeed a bad thing. And everyone immediately decides that it must not continue, that things must change, etc. But since no one bothers with the practical ways and means, this decision remains a pious hope and the thing may well recur ten times; and by the tenth time everyone has already forgotten the ninth. The general feeling, expressed not so much in the responses as in the silences, is clearly: "Why make a drama out of it?" But this is a false idea because it's not a matter of a drama and the choice is not between drama and passivity. But in this way the problem, when it eventually is dealt with, is dealt with only dramatically, as many of our exclusions have shown. [14] Between rupture and the contentment of principle, there doesn't appear to be room for real critique, which remains useless and can be dismissed as bad humor (without denying that a quite real bad humor is exhibited by nearly all of us, in inverse proportion to our indulgence in open critique: in nearly all personal encounters with a situationist, one sees a sort of vague discontent, which is in contrast to the tranquility of the majority of our meetings). [15]
[16] It goes without saying that, in speaking of "critique," I do not simply deplore the sleep of critique in its "negative" aspect, but on the "positive" side, as well: to find useful, develop, aim at re-using a theory or action of one of the comrades [in the SI]. [17] I have mentioned the prompt critique of the errors of the pro-situs, not in order to say that it is not in itself justified, but in order to note that the pro-situs are not our principal reference point (any more than ICO [18] or the leftist bureaucrats). Our principal reference point is ourselves, it is our own operation. The underdevelopment of internal criticism in the SI clearly reflects, at the same time that it contributes toward, the underdevelopment of our (theoretico-practical) action.[19]
I have forcefully evoked the meeting of 14 July [1970]. I recall that, in a note concerning our use of traditional means of communication, I'd criticized the tendency of many comrades to walk around in a daze; [20] to forget matters already settled several times; and, more rarely, to argue the losing side of an old issue, the reprises of which have already wasted our time. Rene-Donatien is concerned about it. This is fortunate, because he has effectively been the most affected by it. But he feels most unjustly attacked; it surprises him that someone could be hostile enough to impute to him errors, the existence of which he was unaware -- and this is just a recent example (there will be others, more hostile). Rene-Donatien's surprise surprises me. But he hardly surprises the [other] French comrades; they recall from direct experience the many examples that he has forgotten; they are so accustomed to the ideas that he perpetually forgets and that this isn't something serious, that, even for them, it is useless to talk to him anymore. Here it is, an attitude that is neither effective for the SI nor friendly to Rene-Donatien. I believe it would be tedious for me and for everyone else to write a few pages that enumerate some of these examples. I would do it, however, if Rene-Donatien (or another comrade) asked. Inversely, if no one asks, the existence of these examples would be admitted by all, and no one would permit a new, artificial discussion about whether they exist or not. At this same meeting [14 July 1970], four witnesses were necessary to convince Rene-Donatien that he had formulated an erroneous judgment, one a little too favorable, concerning an entirety innocuous person. In the many reprises of this kind of discussion over the last two years, Rene-Donatien has denied the reality when confronted with the word for it. But then, having forgotten it, he denies ever saying it. Faced with outside confirmation of his forgetfulness, he has evoked the possibility of a veritable "amnesia" (forgetting the fact that the most sincere forgetfulness absolutely does not give one the right to deny someone else's positive memory, which is objectively insulting). It seems to me that passing from a trenchant certitude to the profession of complete uncertainty is as exaggerated as instantly passing from the assurance that the SI is quasi-perfect to the conclusion that the SI is nothing and can no longer do anything. [21] Meanwhile, (partial) amnesia is a problem in the SI, but not as the specific malady of just one of us.[22]
I think that all this is only a symptom of a correctable deficiency: several situationists' lack of cohabitation with their own practice. I almost always remember the times I have been mistaken; and I acknowledge them rather often even when no one reminds me of them. I am led to think that this is because I am rarely mistaken, having never concealed the fact that I have nothing to say on the numerous subjects in which I am ignorant, and habitually keeping in mind several contradictory hypotheses regarding the possible development of events when I don't yet discern the qualitative leap. In speaking here for myself I would nevertheless like to believe that, as Raoul would put it, I am also speaking for some others. And, by anticipation, for all those comrades who will decide to consciously self-manage their own basic activity. [23]
In response to Rene-Donatien, I voluntarily agreed on 14 July [1970] that my critiques do not concern important or serious matters, but what all these details amount to. If one slacks off, by anti-dialectically separating the sphere of the important from the infra-world of details, one will be sure to never interfere with them. Besides, the accumulation of a quantity of details can qualitatively affect an organization [such as the SI], depending on whether one judges them to be boring or charming, especially if their existence is known by all and, at one time or another, presented as an unexpected hypothesis that remains to be proved. I think that one would have to have quarrels with elementary formal logic to believe that I have unfriendly feelings towards Comrade Rene-Donatien, who over the years hasn't been able to wear out my patience. On many important points (doubtless neglected by other comrades), we are in agreement or very close to it. In my estimation, Rene-Donatien is one of the very few comrades who generally shows himself able to qualitatively judge concrete situations, in the sense in which I speak in paragraph 4 [above] -- although sometimes the strangeness of his argumentation, and his tendency to incertitude at the moment of moving to practical conclusions, have paralyzed a part of the effects of his central comprehension. Although he has been more occupied with certain "technical" questions than any other comrade, he truly is not an expert in the two or three subjects that he takes pride in knowing something about (I haven't forgotten his sense of humor, [24] but I wonder if certain comrades aren't mistaken, especially since a sense of humor isn't widespread in the SI). And I suppose that, if Rene-Donatien proposes the semi-humorous goal of absolutely excelling in and by a crowd of masteries, it is because he hasn't sufficiently developed the most general capacities, which he possesses in a wild state. Of the sort that we lose all to them. (It can't be said that we must be indifferent to the knowledge or mastery of many specific domains, but that is another story).
I hope that, in what remains of this discussion, it isn't necessary to make portraits, in the style of the 17th century, of one or several situationists. It is better to keep quiet than to speak in noble generalities that become ridiculous abstractions with regard to certain retardations in our real practice. It is necessary to see, and dominate, the concrete obstacles. There is a veritable agreement among us, but the territory of the accord is nearly unoccupied (in comparison with its definition, which is exacting, but, I believe, fittingly exacting). This "territory of agreeement" -- of which I have spoken, loud and clear, as the place where the qualitative plays and verifies itself -- is obviously the essential aspect of our collective enterprise in the SI (and not specific talents nor circumstantial errors) and is also the essential aspect of the personal lives of each one of us (and certainly not taste nor individual bizarreness). It is here that it is necessary to engage our dialectic, because, if it can't prove itself here, then it is mutilated and false elsewhere. And this "territory" is equally the central domain where none of us can be stronger than the others; if not, hierarchical relations will exist de facto, despite the illusions or good intentions of all and each.
The triviality of the real envisioned here (at least as a menacing possibility) leads us to say or repeat banalities that make one blush, as if one was simply drafting the plan for a fortress of theory. As an example: if an anti-hierarchical group takes up the habit of giving only one of its members the function of reason (the analysis of what one does and knowledge of the results), even if the external effects are found to be fortunate each time, then this group would in fact depend upon the caprice of this one individual. To the precise extent that one lets another person determine the favorable outcome of a problem that has been encountered, this caprice finds that it already has sufficient reason; in the same way, really having reason, but no effective control, leads to simple caprice.[25]
The style of organization defined by the SI and that we have tried to implement is not that of the councils or even that which we have outlined for revolutionary organizations in general; it is specific, linked to our task as we have understood it so far. This style has had some obvious successes. Even now it is not a question of criticizing it for lacking effectiveness: if we successfully overcome the present problems of the phase of entering into a "new era," we will continue to be more "effective" than many others; and if we don't overcome them, it doesn't much matter if we have carried out a few publications and encounters a little slower or a little faster. I am thus not criticizing any ineffectiveness of this style of organization, but the essential fact that at the moment this style is not really being applied among us. If, in spite of all its advantages, our organizational formula has this sole fault of not being real, it is obvious that we must at all costs make it real or else renounce it and devise another style of organization, whether for a continuation of the SI or for a regroupment on other bases, for which the new era will sooner or later create the conditions. In any case, to take up Paolo's phrase, most of us "will not stop dancing." We must only stop pretending.
Since the present problem is not at the simply theoretical level (and since it is dissimulated when we carry on theoretical discussions, which are moreover virtually contentless since they immediately lead to a consequenceless unanimity), I don't think we can settle it by constituting formal tendencies (much less by forgetting about it). I think that each of us might first try to find with one other situationist, chosen by affinity and experience and after very thorough discussion, a theoretico-practical accord that takes account of all the elements we are already aware of (and of those that may appear in the process of continuing this discussion). This accord could then, with the same prudence, be extended to another, etc. We might in this way arrive at a few regroupments that would be capable of dialoguing with each other -- whether to oppose each other or to come to an agreement. The process could be long (but not necessarily so) and it would probably be one way to put into practice the perspective evoked a few months ago but scarcely developed since of "rejoining the SI" (without formally suspending the present accord, but by here and now preparing its future). Suffice it to say that it is time to seek concrete individuals behind the now-evident abstraction of the "SI organization"; and to find out what they really want to do and can do. Without claiming that this will produce a stable assurance for the future, it would at least make it possible to bring into the open and deal with all the difficulties and discouraging impressions that have already been noted. We still have to talk about all this until acts permit us to shut up.
Note: written by Guy Debord, 27 July 1970. Excerpted translation by Ken Knabb (1981) under title Remarks on the SI Today (Excerpts). Additional translations and all footnotes by NOT BORED! September 2004.
Footnotes:[1] Paolo Salvadori was a member of the Italian section of the Situationist International (SI).
[2] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[3] Jon Horelick was one of only two situationists in America; JV Martin was completely alone in Scandanavia.
[4] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[5] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[6] The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP).
[7] On the image of the "knight," especially riding a horse, see Greil Marcus's take on the situationists in Lipstick Traces on a Cigarette: A Secret History of the 20th Century (1989).
[8] At the time this was written, the Editorial Committee consisted of Rene Riesel, Rene Vienet and Christian Sebastiani. The "fourth" was Francois de Beaulieu, who resigned earlier in the year.
[9] The French situationists planned to publish a thirteenth issue of their journal L'Internationale Situationniste, but it never came out.
[10] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[11] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[12] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[13] The GRCA, Groupe Revolutionnaire Conseilliste d'Agitations (Revolutionary Councilist Group of Agitation) was one of many "pro-situ" groups in the aftermath of May 1968.
[14] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[15] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[16] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[17] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[18] For more on the SI's relationship with ICO (Informations et Correspondence Ouvrieres), see Reading ICO (1967) and What Makes ICO Lie? (1969).
[19] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[20] L'etourderie can be translated as "dizziness" or the state of being "scatterbrained."
[21] Very similar to the denunciation of Raoul Vaneigem in "Communique of the SI Concerning Vaneigem," written by Guy Debord and Rene Vienet, and published as an appendix to La Veritable Scission dans l'International Situationniste (1972).
[22] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[23] Begin passage left out by Ken Knabb.
[24] Rene Vienet's sense of humor is best shown in his detourned 1973 film, La dialectique, peut-etre elle casser les briques?
[25] End passage left out by Ken Knabb.